FCA financial crime supervision is no longer fit for purpose: the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 and the 2028 transfer

FCA AML supervision under the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 and FSMA 2000 (ss.166, 206): 94 specialists for 16,000 firms, fines years after the breach, and a Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] adding about 60,000 firms.

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Charles Pycraft · November 2026 · London

Cover card: FCA financial crime supervision. Navy ground, a grid of small squares with two lit in gold and a gold magnifying glass beside it. Labelled MLRs 2017, FSMA 2000 ss.166, 206, Financial Services and Markets Bill, small CP mark. By Charles Pycraft

This article is part of Offshore: the enabler chain. It sits in pillar 2: Why the watchdogs miss it, and follows Professional-body AML supervision is no longer fit for purpose in the reading order. Start with the series overview if you are new to the work.

Opinion. Updated on 17 November 2026.

The short version

The previous piece explains why the government chose the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) as the single anti-money laundering supervisor for lawyers, accountants and trust and company service providers. This piece asks a different question: how well does the FCA's financial crime supervision of financial firms work today, and can that model carry about 60,000 more firms from late 2028?

The published record shows real powers and large fines. It also shows, on HM Treasury's figures for 2024-25, 94 dedicated specialists for about 16,000 firms and roughly six desk reviews or visits for every 100 of those firms. Three of the four 2025 fines discussed below were announced more than three years after the relevant breach periods ended. As at 17 November 2026 the published transfer plan sets no inspection coverage targets and no penalty starting points for smaller incoming firms, and HM Treasury has ruled out new powers to police the perimeter. In my view, that model is no longer fit for the purpose it is about to be given.

What the law asks of the FCA

The FCA supervises financial firms under two frameworks. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) gives it an integrity objective, which includes the financial system "not being used for a purpose connected with financial crime". The Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (the Money Laundering Regulations 2017) make it a supervisory authority for the firms in its population.

For fines on firms, step 2 of the FCA's penalty policy (DEPP 6.5A) uses one of five levels from 0 to 20 per cent of relevant revenue when revenue reflects the harm or potential harm. Otherwise it uses "an appropriate alternative". The four 2025 fines below were imposed under section 206 of FSMA. Monzo and Nationwide had revenue-based step 2 figures. Both Barclays notices used measures of funds at risk or handled instead. For regulation 76 penalties, the FCA's Enforcement Guide (ENFG App 2.2.2G) points to DEPP 6.2.1G and DEPP 6.5 to 6.5D. The Barclays notices show the alternative exists. What is missing, in my view, is a published rule for when a small accountancy practice or trust company would be fined on something other than its modest revenue. The FCA's June 2026 consultation on DEPP changes (CP26/19) deals with penalties on individuals, decision-makers and cryptoasset market abuse, and does not address it.

The FCA's AML population in figures

HM Treasury's AML and counter-terrorist financing supervision report 2024-25, published on 8 December 2025, is the latest edition. It covers 6 April 2024 to 5 April 2025. For the FCA it records:

The report notes that the staff and spend figures exclude the FCA's wider supervision and enforcement teams, which also contribute. It also records that the FCA does not yet assess firms in a way that gives a number for persistent non-compliance, and that it is working on this.

The 965 desk reviews and visits amount to roughly six assessments per 100 supervised firms. The headcount works out at one dedicated specialist per 170 firms. The Treasury's table of assessments by risk shows 451 on high-risk firms, including only four of the 31 onsite visits, against about 2,300 firms rated high risk. Around 10 per cent of assessments reached an outcome that year. Of the businesses with an in-year outcome, 51 per cent were compliant, 41 per cent generally compliant and 8 per cent non-compliant. Sector reviews add reach. The FCA's annual report and accounts 2025/26 says reviews of more than 300 corporate finance firms "found up to two-thirds non-compliant with Money Laundering Regulations", with similar reviews of 300 lending firms and 300 asset managers.

What 2025/26 enforcement shows

The FCA's enforcement data for 2025/26, published on 9 July 2026, says more than 75 per cent of its enforcement work focuses on financial crime. In the year to 31 March 2026 it:

Four published FCA fines illustrate the year's enforcement on financial crime controls. On 8 July 2025 the FCA announced a £21,091,300 fine on Monzo Bank Ltd for inadequate anti-financial crime systems and controls between October 2018 and August 2020, and for repeatedly breaching a requirement not to open accounts for high-risk customers between August 2020 and June 2022. On 16 July 2025 it announced fines of £3,093,600 on Barclays Bank UK PLC and £39,314,700 on Barclays Bank PLC, rounded by the FCA to £42 million, in two separate cases on financial crime risk management. Barclays Bank UK PLC also agreed a voluntary payment of £6,281,757 for clients of a third-party firm who faced a shortfall. On 12 December 2025 it announced a £44,078,500 fine on Nationwide Building Society for inadequate anti-financial crime systems and controls between October 2016 and July 2021. Each fine reflects a 30 per cent discount for early settlement. Each release also records remediation work by the firm.

The four fines total £107,578,100, about 88 per cent of the value of the FCA's fines on firms in 2025/26. In the Nationwide release the FCA said that since 2021 it had imposed 13 fines on banks for anti-money laundering systems and controls failings, totalling £300,767,526. The latest breach periods ended in April 2021 for Barclays Bank PLC, July 2021 for Nationwide and June 2022 for Monzo, and April 2023 for Barclays Bank UK PLC.

On 25 June 2026 the FCA published its section 205 censure of CACEIS Bank (UK Branch), an asset servicing bank, for financial crime control failings. It took the bank's co-operation and £31,714,068 voluntary payment into account when deciding to issue a censure without a fine. The FCA's 2026 fines list, last updated on 21 October 2026 and unchanged on 17 November, contains no firm penalty for anti-money laundering controls.

The 2028 transfer: decided and undecided

The FCA's AML supervisory reform page, first published on 22 September 2026, says the transfer will cover about 60,000 businesses, about 18,000 of them now with HMRC. Its timeline: complete an operating model review in 2027, start a phased transition in late 2028, and bring the remaining professional bodies across in 2030. Initial funding comes from the Economic Crime Levy, then from fees. In 2025/26 the FCA invoiced 2,431 firms £105.3 million for the levy, collected £105.2 million and paid £105.3 million into the Consolidated Fund. These are levy accounts, separate from the FCA's supervision budget.

HM Treasury's June 2026 consultation response on duties, powers and accountability settles three relevant points.

The enabling clauses are in the Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL], which had its Commons second reading on 10 November 2026. The Public Bill Committee first meets on Tuesday 24 November 2026 and is expected to report by 15 December 2026. Clause 25 was added in the Lords as a non-government amendment, as the Commons Library briefing records. It would require a regulator directing a person to provide a section 166 report to be satisfied that there is "a material risk of serious detriment to regulatory outcomes" and that using a skilled person is a proportionate response. The clause addresses the power to require a report; section 166 also lets the regulator appoint a skilled person directly. The Commons amendments tabled up to 17 November 2026 include none to clause 25.

Why this reading says "no longer fit for purpose"

The FCA's financial crime work is not failing in the sense of doing nothing. It brings large cases, it has raised its specialist headcount, its reviews are finding problems, and on 23 October 2026 it announced restrictions imposed at the request of six Annex 1 lenders it supervises only for anti-money laundering. The argued reading is narrower: by "no longer fit for purpose" I mean the purpose the FCA is about to be given. As I read it, the model leans on large fines on a few big firms, three of the four announced more than three years after the breach ended, and on about six desk reviews or visits a year for every 100 firms. In my view that deterrent is visible to a bank. It would be much less visible to a hypothetical 20-person trust company after transfer: its revenue would be small, no published rule says what would replace it, and at the 2024-25 rate there would be about one desk review or visit a year for every 17 firms.

The projected intake of about 60,000 businesses and sole practitioners would bring the total to nearly five times the FCA's reported 2024-25 population, if that baseline held. On the latest published report, the FCA could not yet put a number on persistent non-compliance in its current population. In my view it will need that measure before it takes on a larger one. Without a published operating model, a coverage baseline, penalty starting points that fit smaller firms, a stronger perimeter tool and separate reporting, the risk is that resources are spread thinner across banks and professional firms alike. On today's record, my reading is that the gap moves rather than closes.

What should change

  1. Publish the professional-services operating model before transfer. Publish the 2027 operating model review in full: specialist headcount, budget, and first-year review coverage by risk band. Owner: the FCA to publish, with scrutiny by HM Treasury and the Treasury Committee.
  2. Publish the coverage baseline for today's population. The previous piece asks for an inspection target for incoming firms. The baseline is missing. In line with regulation 46(2)(c), publish each year the share of high-risk and medium-risk financial firms reviewed, the share reaching an outcome, and the persistent non-compliance measure once it exists. Owner: the FCA, reported through HM Treasury's regulation 51 supervision report.
  3. Say what replaces revenue as the yardstick. The previous piece asks for a published penalty framework for professional-services firms; this is its missing part. Where revenue understates harm, the FCA should consult on when it will use measures such as client money at risk or transaction values at step 2 for regulation 76 penalties, while retaining the current settlement discount scheme. CP26/19 did not do this. Owner: the FCA, through a consultation on DEPP and its Enforcement Guide; HM Treasury for the minor-fines process it has said it will consult on.
  4. Ring-fence the bank and payments programme. Keep financial crime supervision of banks, e-money, payments and cryptoasset firms as a separately staffed and budgeted programme, so the new population does not dilute it. Owner: the FCA Board for the budget, HM Treasury for levy-funded set-up and the FCA for the fees consultation.
  5. Police the perimeter, and count it. Revisit the June 2026 decision against new perimeter powers. Treasury reported that the FCA identified 36 unregistered businesses in 2024-25. The FCA should track detections and outcomes every year, and HM Treasury should request that data under regulation 51. The FCA and Companies House should agree lawful access to the underlying authorised corporate service provider records for cross-checks, since the published list is opt-in. Owner: HM Treasury and Parliament, through amendments to the Regulations; the FCA; Companies House.
  6. Report the resource split every year. Publish financial crime staff and spend split between the largest banks, other financial firms and professional services, with outcomes for each. Owner: the FCA in its annual report; HM Treasury through the supervision report.
  7. Keep skilled person reviews whole for financial crime. Financial crime was the largest subject of the FCA's skilled person reviews in 2025/26, at 12 of 31. MPs should remove clause 25 or exempt reports on financial crime controls. HM Treasury should keep its proposed reasonableness test, modelled on regulation 74B, for the new skilled person power under the Regulations, and go no higher. Owner: MPs at committee or report stage for clause 25, and HM Treasury for the Regulations.

About this piece

Public sources only, as linked. Disclosure: I work on business development and communications for Partisan, which offers file fingerprint receipts for comparing copies. The article reports published FCA findings and records remedial steps or co-operation where the FCA identifies them. It makes no allegation beyond those published findings. Holding money offshore is not itself unlawful. Opinion is marked as argued reading. This piece is for general information and is not legal advice.

Previous: Professional-body AML supervision is no longer fit for purpose

Next: Enabler liability is no longer fit for purpose: what trust lawyers, trustees and company providers face

Related: Companies House identity checks: enforcement is no longer fit for purpose; Unexplained Wealth Orders are no longer fit for purpose

Series overview: Offshore: the enabler chain

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