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Malta: passports, Pilatus and the price of a licence

Malta after Pilatus Bank, the 2021 inquiry and the EU Court's ruling in C-181/23: what the Maltese Citizenship Act (Cap. 188), Act XXI of 2025 and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (Cap. 373) now do, and six fixes.

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71 paragraphs

Charles Pycraft · November 2026 · London

Cover card: Malta, passports, Pilatus and a licence. Navy ground, a balance where a stack of gold coins outweighs a passport and a licence card. Labelled Cap. 188, Cap. 373, Act XXI of 2025, C-181/23, small CP mark. By Charles Pycraft

This article is part of Offshore: the enabler chain. It sits in pillar 1: How money moves, and who enables it, and follows the Cyprus piece on gatekeeper supervision under Law 188(I)/2007 in the reading order. Start with the series overview if you are new to the work.

Opinion. Updated on 18 November 2026.

The short version

From 2014 to 2025, Malta ran two schemes that offered citizenship in return for investment, under the Maltese Citizenship Act. A Maltese banking licence offered a different route into the single market through EU passporting, subject to notification requirements. Four official records show what that cost. The European Central Bank withdrew the authorisation of Pilatus Bank in November 2018. A public inquiry reported in July 2021 that the state should bear responsibility for a journalist's assassination by creating a climate of impunity, while finding no evidence of a state role in the killing. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) put Malta on its grey list from June 2021 to June 2022. In April 2025 the EU Court of Justice ruled that Malta's 2020 passport scheme broke EU law.

The ECB withdrew the bank's licence, the FATF delisted Malta within a year, and Malta repealed the investor route in 2025, by Act XXI of 2025. In my view, the record shows that Malta opened its gates, and priced one of them, before it built the checks behind them, and that the gates which remain, licensing and anti-money laundering supervision, still publish too little for outsiders to judge whether the checks now work.

Pilatus Bank: the licence and its withdrawal

Pilatus Bank was licensed on 3 January 2014 as a credit institution under the Banking Act (Cap. 371) by the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA). In 2018 United States prosecutors charged the bank's chairman. On 22 March 2018 the MFSA appointed a competent person to take control. The MFSA proposed withdrawal on 29 June and revised its proposal on 2 August. The ECB decided on 2 November to withdraw the authorisation, effective 5 November 2018. In February 2024 the Court of Justice set aside the General Court's judgment and dismissed the bank's challenge as inadmissible.

On 11 July 2018 the European Banking Authority (EBA) issued a recommendation to Malta's Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit (FIAU), finding that it had breached Union law in its supervision of the bank. The FIAU had disputed the preliminary finding. The EBA asked the FIAU to assess risk across the sector, supervise whether firms' controls worked, and secure enough resources.

In New York, a jury found the chairman guilty in March 2020 on sanctions and related charges. On 17 July 2020, after prosecutors acknowledged disclosure failures and decided not to continue, the court vacated the verdict and dismissed the indictment with prejudice. It stated that there was never a judgment of conviction and that the verdict "has no legal effect". In Malta, the FIAU imposed an administrative penalty of 4,975,500 euros in August 2021, citing "very serious and systemic" failures in the bank's anti-money laundering controls. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision in full on 12 February 2025; MaltaToday reported the court as saying that the bank "had lost every control on its business operations". In separate Maltese criminal proceedings, Pilatus Bank and a former senior official were charged with money laundering on 2 September 2021. Both pleaded not guilty. MaltaToday reported that on 1 October 2021 a magistrate found sufficient prima facie evidence to proceed against the former official, and that on 10 March 2025 an expert told the court that decryption of the bank's data could take years. I found no published verdict as at 18 November 2026.

The public inquiry report of July 2021

The public inquiry held its first hearing in December 2019. Its board presented its report, "Public Inquiry Report Daphne Caruana Galizia: A Journalist Assassinated on 16th October 2017", to the Prime Minister on 29 July 2021. In an unofficial English courtesy translation, not the board's own text, the board found no evidence that the state as such had any role in the killing. It concluded that the state should nonetheless bear responsibility for the assassination, by creating a climate of impunity "generated from the highest levels at the core of the administration" and "spreading its tentacles to other entities such as regulatory institutions and the Police", which led to the collapse of the rule of law.

The board also found that "almost all the institutions of the country failed to react appropriately and effectively". Among its recommendations, it called for changes to criminal law and to the laws "which regulate financial institutions", so that a de facto state of impunity does not develop again. These are findings of a public inquiry, not criminal verdicts.

Golden passports: the Individual Investor Programme and the 2020 regulations

The first scheme was the Individual Investor Programme, set up by L.N. 47 of 2014. A main applicant paid a contribution of 650,000 euros, and the scheme was capped at 1,800 successful main applicants. In July 2020 Act XXXVIII of 2020 rewrote Article 10(9), and on 20 November 2020 Malta adopted the Granting of Citizenship for Exceptional Services Regulations (L.N. 437 of 2020, now S.L. 188.06), and set up the Community Malta Agency (L.N. 436 of 2020) to run applications.

Under the 2020 rules, the main contribution was 600,000 euros with 36 months' legal residence, or 750,000 euros with a minimum of 12 months. Applicants also had to buy a home worth at least 700,000 euros or rent one for at least 16,000 euros a year, and donate at least 10,000 euros. Grants were capped at 400 a year and 1,500 overall, excluding dependants.

The EU Court judgment of 29 April 2025 in Commission v Malta (C-181/23)

After two letters of formal notice and a reasoned opinion, the European Commission brought the case on 21 March 2023. On 29 April 2025 the Grand Chamber ruled that by establishing and operating the 2020 scheme, Malta had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 20 TFEU and Article 4(3) TEU. The Court held that Malta's transactional scheme commercialised the grant of Maltese and EU citizenship. In the Court's press summary, a member state cannot grant its nationality "in exchange for predetermined payments or investments", because that "essentially amounts to rendering the acquisition of nationality a mere commercial transaction".

Malta's response was the Maltese Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2025 (Act XXI of 2025), dated 24 July 2025. It replaces Article 10(9) with naturalisation "by merit" for people who render exceptional services or make an exceptional contribution, "including through job creation", or whose naturalisation is of exceptional interest to Malta. The amending regulations, L.N. 159 of 2025, provide that investor applications not approved by the Minister before 29 April 2025 cease to have effect.

What the law says: Cap. 373, the supervisors and their outcomes

The core statute is the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (Cap. 373). It establishes the FIAU, which receives suspicious transaction reports and supervises firms' anti-money laundering compliance. The MFSA licenses financial institutions under the Financial Institutions Act (Cap. 376) and shares bank supervision with the ECB. Since November 2014 the ECB has decided bank licence grants on MFSA proposals and can withdraw licences on its own initiative or on an MFSA proposal.

The FIAU's Annual Report 2025 records administrative measures against 11 distinct subject persons in 2025 and penalties totalling 1,340,242 euros. At year-end it reported 796 fines totalling 30,747,413 euros. Of those, 75 had been appealed, with 7,628,145 euros still pending determination. The report says that on 20 October 2025 the Constitutional Court reaffirmed its November 2024 rulings on compatibility with the fair-hearing guarantees in Article 39(1) of Malta's Constitution and Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The MFSA's enforcement overview for 2025 lists 91 enforcement actions and penalties of 570,673 euros. Company service providers accounted for 143,150 euros and trustees for 27,160 euros. Seven licences were cancelled and ten reports went to the police.

The grey list, MONEYVAL and the next test

MONEYVAL, the Council of Europe's evaluators, adopted its mutual evaluation of Malta on 18 July 2019. Its first enhanced follow-up, adopted in April 2021, rated Malta compliant on 12 of the 40 FATF Recommendations and largely compliant on the other 28, but kept Malta in enhanced follow-up. MONEYVAL noted that follow-up reports do not assess whether reforms work in practice.

In June 2021 the FATF placed Malta under increased monitoring. The action plan asked Malta to show that company ownership information was accurate, to sanction gatekeepers who failed to obtain it, and to use financial intelligence in tax-related money laundering cases. On 17 June 2022 the FATF removed Malta from the list. MONEYVAL's current schedule puts Malta's next on-site visit in April 2028, with plenary discussion in December 2028.

The EU layer: AMLA

The EU package of June 2024 created the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA) under Regulation (EU) 2024/1620. From 2028 AMLA will directly supervise up to 40 selected high-risk financial entities or groups in its first cycle. The FIAU remains the domestic anti-money laundering supervisor for Malta's company service providers. AMLA can review how non-financial supervisors carry out their work, as the Cyprus piece explains.

Why this reading says the price was too high

In my view, the argued reading is not that Malta did nothing. The bank was shut, Malta left the grey list within a year, the FIAU's penalty powers survived a constitutional challenge and the investor route was repealed. It is that the gates were opened first and checked later, and that the public record still tells us too little about how the checks work.

First, the decisive findings came from outside. The ECB withdrew the bank's licence on the MFSA's proposal, but the EBA found the FIAU's breach of Union law, the grey listing came from the FATF and the passport ruling came from Luxembourg.

Second, the repeal left existing grants subject to the applicable deprivation rules. The Regulator's 2024 report, laid in April 2026, says in its October 2025 foreword that six investor citizens had lost citizenship since 2014 and four more cases had reached an advanced stage. It separately records that neither administering agency had supplied deprivation information to the Regulator's office through 2024 and says reporting would begin with the 2025 report. I found no published review of grants across both schemes.

Third, in my view the amended merit route gives the Minister wide discretion. The Act defines exceptional merit and includes job creation as one possible exceptional contribution. The Regulator's latest published report covers 2024, and I found no published count under the amended Article 10(9).

Fourth, outcomes are hard to read. The FIAU and the MFSA publish totals and notices, but 7.6 million euros of FIAU fines were still on appeal at the end of 2025, and the Pilatus criminal case had no verdict I could find. I found no routine publication of reasons for granting Maltese bank licences, the same gap as in the FSC Mauritius piece.

Who owns the fix

The Maltese government and the House of Representatives own the Maltese Citizenship Act and Cap. 373. The Community Malta Agency administers naturalisation applications. The Regulator for the Granting of Citizenship by Exceptional Merit reports annually to the Minister, who lays the report before the House. The MFSA supervises banks, proposes bank licensing decisions to the ECB and authorises financial institutions; the FIAU supervises anti-money laundering compliance and receives reports. Malta must comply with the judgment. The European Commission can bring follow-up proceedings, and AMLA has EU anti-money laundering supervisory and coordination duties. MONEYVAL's Malta evaluation is scheduled for 2028. The FATF decides on grey-listing.

What should change

Good systems serve everyone, and cause and consequence are easier to trace when every gate leaves a public record of what it checked.

  1. Report merit naturalisation in public, on time. Publish within a year the number of grants under the new Article 10(9), by category, with the criteria applied, and report how many grants under the 2014 and 2020 schemes have been reviewed and how many deprivation orders have been made under Article 14 of the Maltese Citizenship Act. Owner: citizenship Minister and Community Malta Agency, with the Regulator. The House can scrutinise the figures and set any statutory deadline.
  2. Publish due diligence results and refusals. Publish comparable aggregate refusal and withdrawal figures for the two former investor schemes and merit naturalisation. Share aggregate figures with other member states. Owner: Community Malta Agency and citizenship Minister, with the Regulator.
  3. Explain each bank licence and financial institution authorisation. Publish reasons for new financial institution authorisations and seek equivalent summaries from the ECB for new bank licences, wherever confidentiality and professional secrecy rules permit. Publish a review, within the same limits, of the MFSA's January 2014 Pilatus licensing decision, made before the ECB took over bank licensing, and the bank's subsequent supervision. Owner: MFSA, with the ECB for banks.
  4. Publish gatekeeper outcomes in full. Report yearly by sector on sanctions for gatekeepers that fail to obtain accurate, up-to-date beneficial ownership information, the time from finding to penalty and appeal outcomes, building on the gatekeeper item in the 2021 FATF action plan. Publish the results for inaccurate company filings separately. Owner: FIAU, with the MFSA and Malta Business Registry for their respective powers.
  5. Follow the judgment through in public. Ask the European Commission to publish its assessment of whether Act XXI of 2025 and L.N. 159 of 2025 comply with C-181/23. Ask AMLA to consider the FIAU's supervision of company service providers and trustees when setting its peer-review programme. Owners: European Commission for compliance follow-up and AMLA for peer reviews.
  6. Test effectiveness in 2028. Use the April 2028 visit to test whether gatekeeper sanctions and licensing checks work in practice, not only the laws, and how Malta addresses any money laundering risks linked to naturalisation. Owner: MONEYVAL.

What firms can do now. In Malta the published findings turned on records, from the customer due diligence files the FIAU found wanting at the bank to the accurate ownership information the FATF's action plan demanded. Partisan records a file's fingerprint without seeing or keeping the document, gives a dated receipt, and shows a file is unchanged since it was recorded. Try it on one PDF for £45 (credited towards a full job), or cover a whole firm's assurance, insolvency or investigation files for £350 a month. partisangateway.com

About this piece

Public sources only, as linked. Disclosure: I work on business development and communications for Partisan, which offers file fingerprint receipts for comparing copies, and the note on what firms can do now describes its paid service. Partisan supplied nothing else for this article. People and firms other than the bank and Partisan are referred to by role; outcomes are as published by courts, regulators, the public inquiry, the FATF and MONEYVAL, or as reported by MaltaToday and the Times of Malta where stated. Charges are not findings of guilt. It makes no allegation against any person or firm beyond those findings. Opinion is marked as argued reading. This is general information, not legal advice.

Previous: Cyprus after Cyprus Confidential: gatekeeper supervision under Law 188(I)/2007

Next: Hong Kong's trust and company service providers: why Cap. 615 licensing is no longer fit for purpose

Related: The FSC Mauritius is no longer fit for purpose; FINMA is no longer fit for purpose; Professional-body AML supervision is no longer fit for purpose; Enabler liability is no longer fit for purpose

Series overview: Offshore: the enabler chain

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