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Cyprus after Cyprus Confidential: Russian wealth, sanctions, and why gatekeeper supervision under Law 188(I)/2007 is no longer fit for purpose

Cyprus after Cyprus Confidential: how CySEC, ICPAC and the Cyprus Bar Association supervise gatekeepers under Law 188(I)/2007, what sanctions Laws 149(I) and 150(I) of 2025 and Directive (EU) 2024/1640 change, and six fixes.

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Charles Pycraft · November 2026 · London

Cover card: Cyprus after Cyprus Confidential. Navy ground, three separate rings that do not meet and a gold file between them. Labelled Law 188(I)/2007, Laws 149(I) and 150(I)/2025, Directive (EU) 2024/1640, small CP mark. By Charles Pycraft

This article is part of Offshore: the enabler chain. It sits in pillar 1: How money moves, and who enables it, and follows Overseas Territories beneficial ownership registers are no longer fit for purpose in the reading order. Start with the series overview if you are new to the work.

Opinion. Updated on 18 November 2026.

The short version

For years Cyprus was a centre for corporate and financial services used by wealthy foreign clients, and until 2020 it ran a citizenship-by-investment programme. Al Jazeera reported on leaked applications in 2020, and an official inquiry later examined how the programme was administered. In April 2023 the United States and the United Kingdom announced sanctions involving Cyprus-based companies and professionals. In November 2023 the Cyprus Confidential investigation reported, from leaked records, on services Cyprus-based providers gave wealthy Russian clients before and after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Cyprus has since set up a sanctions implementation unit, made breaking EU sanctions a crime and changed access to its beneficial ownership registers. The tax-free pitch covered Cyprus as a tax and banking product. This piece examines how Cyprus supervises the trust and company service providers who form and run companies. In my view, Cyprus has rebuilt its laws faster than it has shown its supervision working: the public record sets out the legal changes in far more detail than it shows how consistently the three sector supervisors detect and deal with serious breaches. Two of those supervisors are professional associations with no public overseer yet. For the purpose of letting the public see that sanctioned money is kept out, that arrangement is no longer fit for purpose.

What the leaks showed: Cyprus Confidential, 2023

On 14 November 2023 the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and Paper Trail Media began publishing Cyprus Confidential with dozens of media partners, including the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP). The investigation drew on more than 3.6 million leaked files from six Cyprus-based financial service providers and a Latvian company that sold Cypriot registry documents. The ICIJ identified nearly 800 companies and trusts in secrecy jurisdictions, more than 650 of them in Cyprus, that were owned or controlled by Russians sanctioned since 2014. These numbers come from the ICIJ's analysis of leaked records, not from court findings.

On 15 November 2023 the ICIJ reported that the President had pledged a government inquiry. At a House committee meeting on 22 November 2023, according to Cyprus Business Now, the Cyprus Bar Association said it had carried out 177 checks since 2022, imposed disciplinary fines totalling 400,000 euros and, after asking members about clients on sanctions lists, made seven complaints to the police. ICPAC said it had suspended three firms and one individual on the UK sanctions list and had referred ten cases to the police before the investigation was published. It proposed an independent central body, on the British model, to guide the sector supervisors.

Golden passports: the Cyprus Investment Programme, 2007 to 2020

On 23 August 2020 Al Jazeera reported in The Cyprus Papers that leaked records covered more than 1,400 approved applications submitted between 2017 and 2019, involving nearly 2,500 people once family members were included. It released its undercover findings on 12 October 2020. The Council of Ministers decided on 13 October to end the programme, and Cyprus stopped accepting new applications from 1 November 2020. On 20 October 2020 the European Commission opened infringement proceedings against Cyprus and Malta over their investor citizenship schemes.

In September 2020 the Attorney General appointed an inquiry chaired by a former President of the Supreme Court. According to published accounts of its final report, released in June 2021, it examined 6,779 naturalisations from 2007 to 17 August 2020 and concluded that 3,609 people, or 53.24 per cent, had been naturalised outside the legal framework; that group comprised investors' family members and senior company executives. Of the 3,103 investor files examined, 33.58 per cent appeared to fall short of at least one formal criterion at the time of vetting. On 18 January 2023 the Cyprus Mail reported that Cabinet decisions had withdrawn citizenship from 222 people, 63 investors and 159 dependants.

The courts set a limit on what can be said of individuals. On 17 February 2026 the Nicosia Permanent Criminal Court, by a two-to-one majority, acquitted the former House President and a former MP at first instance in the case that followed the Al Jazeera broadcast. The undercover footage was not part of the evidence before the court: the Cyprus Mail reported that the presiding judge said so from the start, and the Law Office later explained why it had not presented the video. At a press conference on 18 February 2026 the Law Office announced that it would appeal, and OmegaLive reported on 11 March 2026 that the appeal had been filed on 3 March. As at 17 November 2026 I had found no published appeal judgment in that case.

In December 2025 Law 224(I)/2025 deleted the statutory basis for naturalising investors. The old rule survives only where a court orders a past decision on an application submitted by 30 October 2020 to be re-examined, and the citizenship withdrawal provisions now expressly cover naturalisations granted under it. On 11 March 2026 the Commission closed its infringement case against Cyprus.

The sanctions designations of April 2023

On 12 April 2023 the US Treasury announced that its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), acting in coordination with the United Kingdom, had designated 25 individuals and 29 entities with touchpoints in 20 jurisdictions. In the network of one sanctioned Russian businessman, Treasury described five designated companies as Cyprus-registered or Cyprus-based. It also identified a separately designated corporate secretary and a designated Cypriot adviser. Of the five people identified as directors in the release's Cyprus-network subsection, four were described as Cypriot nationals or residents.

The same day the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) announced sanctions on two people it described as "Cypriot professional enablers". The UK financial sanctions notice of 12 April 2023 records asset freezes and trust services sanctions for both, with a designation date of 11 April 2023. The FCDO amended its release on 22 September 2025 after another person in the wider announcement was delisted. These were executive sanctions decisions, not criminal convictions.

On 26 March 2024 the US Embassy announced that, following a request from the Cypriot President, the FBI and the Cyprus Police would sign a memorandum of understanding on financial crime cooperation, also involving the Law Office of the Republic and MOKAS, the Cypriot financial intelligence unit. In December 2024 a Cyprus-US joint statement described further training for Cypriot investigators. In March 2025 the Associated Press reported that Cyprus had received an FBI report, after a nine-month secondment, recommending more training, upgraded systems and changes to legislation, and that the government said it would adopt the recommendations.

What the law says: Law 188(I)/2007 and the beneficial ownership registers

The core statute is Law 188(I)/2007, Ο περί της Παρεμπόδισης και Καταπολέμησης της Νομιμοποίησης Εσόδων από Παράνομες Δραστηριότητες Νόμος του 2007 (current Greek consolidated text on CyLaw). An unofficial English consolidation to 2021, published by MOKAS, is titled the Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Law. The CyLaw index lists twenty amending laws, the latest being Law 25(I)/2026, published on 20 March 2026.

Section 59 allocates supervision by sector. The Central Bank of Cyprus supervises banks, and CySEC supervises investment firms and administrative service providers within its remit. For trust and company services, responsibility is divided among CySEC, the Council of the Cyprus Bar Association and ICPAC, depending on whether the provider is a CySEC-authorised firm, a lawyer or an accountant. So three bodies supervise the same trade, and two of them are professional associations.

Section 61A provides for the company beneficial ownership register, administered by the Registrar of Companies. On 22 November 2022 the Court of Justice of the European Union invalidated the rule requiring company beneficial ownership information to be accessible to any member of the general public, and the Registrar suspended general public access from 23 November 2022. Under Law 25(I)/2026, a person or association can apply for access by demonstrating a legitimate interest in preventing or combating money laundering or terrorist financing. That route is limited to the beneficial owner's name, month and year of birth, country of residence, nationality and the nature and extent of the rights held.

Section 61C provides for CySEC's beneficial ownership register of express trusts and similar legal arrangements. Its CyTBOR platform opened to trustees on 17 May 2022. CySEC's policy statement of 4 June 2026 said general public access was removed and that applicants using the public route must demonstrate a legitimate interest. Competent authorities and obliged entities have separate access routes.

The response: the National Sanctions Implementation Unit and Laws 149(I) and 150(I) of 2025

The House approved the sanctions legislation on 10 July 2025, after the 20 May 2025 deadline for transposing Directive (EU) 2024/1226 on criminal offences and penalties for breaching EU sanctions. Both laws were published on 25 July 2025. Law 150(I)/2025 set up the National Sanctions Implementation Unit in the Ministry of Finance to coordinate implementation of EU, UN and national sanctions, assess suspected breaches and impose administrative fines within its remit. Law 149(I)/2025 made specified breaches of EU restrictive measures crimes. Individuals face up to five years in prison for specified offences. For companies, the higher tier is a fine of up to 5 per cent of worldwide turnover, or 40 million euros where turnover cannot be determined; the lower tier is up to 1 per cent or 8 million euros. As at 17 November 2026 I found neither a published conviction under Law 149(I)/2025 nor a published decision by the unit imposing a fine.

The EU layer: AMLA and the 2024 AML package

Three instruments in the EU anti-money-laundering package were published on 19 June 2024. Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 established the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA) in Frankfurt. Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 sets common requirements for obliged entities, generally from 10 July 2027. The sixth AML Directive (EU) 2024/1640 sets requirements for national systems and supervisors. AMLA plans to select 40 high-risk financial entities or groups in 2027 for direct supervision from 2028. Lawyers and accountants stay with national supervisors; AMLA's role there is to review how that supervision works.

The Directive is blunt about that layer. Recital 100 says the quality and intensity of supervision by self-regulatory bodies "has been insufficient, and under no, or close to no, public scrutiny". Article 52 requires public oversight where a member state keeps self-regulatory supervision of lawyers and accountants, and the deadline is 10 July 2027. Article 12, due by 10 July 2026, treats journalists and civil society organisations working on money laundering, its predicate offences or terrorist financing as having a legitimate interest in beneficial ownership information on legal entities and legal arrangements, including express trusts. Law 25(I)/2026 implements Article 74, the earlier register amendment due by 10 July 2025. In its update of 26 October 2026, the Commission listed Cyprus as having communicated no measures for Articles 11, 12, 13 and 15, with infringement proceedings for non-communication pending.

Where Cyprus stands with MONEYVAL

The Council of Europe's evaluators, MONEYVAL, adopted their fifth-round mutual evaluation of Cyprus in December 2019, after an on-site visit from 13 to 24 May 2019. Four relevant outcomes were rated Moderate: supervision, preventive measures, beneficial ownership, and money laundering investigation and prosecution. The evaluators found the Bar Association's entry checks "more limited", "no routine exchange of information" between the three supervisors of administrative service providers about applications rejected on integrity grounds, and "very few sanctions" from non-financial supervisors. They called low reporting by service providers "surprising", given the suspicious activity banks reported in structures generally administered by such providers.

MONEYVAL's fourth enhanced follow-up, adopted on 12 May 2025 and published in June, rates Cyprus compliant or largely compliant on 38 of the 40 FATF Recommendations, with Recommendations 8 and 31 still partially compliant. Cyprus left fifth-round follow-up, and the next on-site visit is scheduled for October 2028. The 2025 report was a desk review of technical compliance; it did not reassess the 2019 effectiveness ratings, so those Moderate ratings have not been re-examined since.

Why this reading says "no longer fit for purpose"

The argued reading is not that Cyprus has done nothing. It ended investor citizenship, sought US investigative support, set up a sanctions unit and revised access to its registers, and its 2025 MONEYVAL follow-up recorded stronger technical compliance. It is that the layer which met the money first is still organised the way the 2019 evaluation criticised, and that the public still cannot see whether it works. Four reasons.

First, responsibility for trust and company service providers remains divided among three supervisors. In 2019 MONEYVAL identified a specific gap: they did not routinely exchange information about applications rejected on integrity grounds. A current public account of how they exchange that information would show whether the gap has closed.

Second, two of those supervisors are professional bodies. The EU itself now says such supervision has been under little or no public scrutiny, and Article 52 sets a standard for public oversight where member states keep that model. As at 17 November 2026 I had found no enacted Cypriot measure implementing Article 52.

Third, legitimate-interest access to beneficial ownership data is now in Cypriot law, but only partly. The Commission's October 2026 update still listed Cyprus as having communicated no measures for the Directive's more detailed access rules, including Article 12, so Cypriot law does not yet give journalists and civil society the presumption of legitimate interest that Article 12 requires. The leaks and the designations came from journalists and foreign governments, not from Cypriot supervision.

Fourth, supervisory outcomes are hard to compare. The professional bodies reported fines, suspensions and police referrals in 2023, MOKAS's annual report gives the number of suspicious transaction and activity reports by sector (for 2024: 36 from company service providers, 26 from lawyers and 19 from accountants and auditors, out of 3,870 in total), and the Cyprus Bar Association publishes AML board decisions. But reports received are not outcomes, and there are no standardised, comparable figures across all three supervisors, and no aggregate outcomes under the new sanctions laws, that would show how concerns move from inspection or referral to a decision. I found no published conviction under Law 149(I)/2025.

Who owns the fix

The Cypriot government can propose legislative changes and the House of Representatives can enact them. CySEC, ICPAC and the Council of the Cyprus Bar Association supervise providers within their respective remits. The Registrar of Companies administers the company register and CySEC the trust register. MOKAS receives and analyses suspicious transaction and activity reports. The National Sanctions Implementation Unit coordinates sanctions implementation, the police investigate suspected offences and the Law Office decides on prosecutions. The European Commission monitors transposition and can bring infringement proceedings. AMLA has EU supervisory and review functions, and MONEYVAL conducts Cyprus's mutual evaluation.

What should change

Six changes would put a public authority over the professional supervisors and let the public see whether supervision works.

  1. A public overseer for the professional supervisors. Before 10 July 2027, designate a public authority to oversee the AML supervisory work of ICPAC and the Council of the Cyprus Bar Association if Cyprus keeps that model. Give it the Article 52 powers to obtain relevant information and issue corrective instructions, and have it publish the annual report Article 52 requires. Protect privileged material, professional secrecy and the independence of legal representation. Owner: Cyprus government and House of Representatives.
  2. Common inspection standards and a shared refusal list. Agree a common risk-based inspection method for trust and company services. Set up a lawful protocol for the three supervisors to share integrity-based refusals of applications, relevant withdrawals and sanctions securely, with rules for access, retention, corrections and review, so that a routine withdrawal or an untested allegation is not treated as a finding. Owner: Cyprus government for any new statutory powers; CySEC, ICPAC and the Council of the Cyprus Bar Association to run the protocol together.
  3. Publish outcomes. Publish decisions imposing AML penalties or administrative measures within a set period where the law permits, anonymised or deferred where required. Publish police referrals as aggregate figures, broken down by sector where that can be done without identifying anyone or prejudicing an investigation. Owner: CySEC, ICPAC and the Council of the Cyprus Bar Association, with aggregate reporting by the public oversight authority once designated.
  4. Open the registers as the Directive intends. Finish the overdue transposition of Article 12 and the related access procedures. Treat journalists and civil society organisations working on money laundering, its predicate offences or terrorist financing as having a legitimate interest in beneficial ownership information on companies, express trusts and similar legal arrangements. Publish clear application and review procedures, with the Directive's privacy safeguards. Owner: Cyprus government and House of Representatives for transposition; Registrar of Companies and CySEC for the registers.
  5. Report sanctions enforcement every year. Keep MOKAS's annual reporting and publish comparable suspicious transaction and activity figures by sector where disclosure is lawful. Publish a separate aggregate series on sanctions referrals, investigations, administrative penalties, prosecutions and court outcomes. Owner: MOKAS for reporting figures; the National Sanctions Implementation Unit, Cyprus Police and Law Office for their sanctions data.
  6. Test supervision before 2028. Commission an independent Cypriot review of how the three supervisors oversee trust and company service providers, and publish it before the October 2028 MONEYVAL visit. Ask AMLA to cover this area in its Article 35 peer reviews, including how any Article 52 authority oversees the professional bodies. Owner: Cyprus government for the domestic review; AMLA for its peer reviews.

What firms can do now. In Cyprus the weak point is the file trail: three supervisors, client files held by the providers themselves, and no public record of what an inspection actually saw. Partisan records a file's fingerprint without seeing or keeping the document, gives a dated receipt, and shows a file is unchanged since it was recorded. Try it on one PDF for £45 (credited towards a full job), or cover a whole firm's assurance, insolvency or investigation files for £350 a month. partisangateway.com

About this piece

Public sources only, as linked. Disclosure: I work on business development and communications for Partisan, which offers file fingerprint receipts for comparing copies, and the note on what firms can do now describes its paid service. Partisan supplied nothing else for this article. This article draws on public legislation, judgments, government statements, MONEYVAL assessments and attributed reporting, and identifies the people discussed by role. Outcomes are as published by courts, regulators and governments, or as reported by the ICIJ, Al Jazeera, Cyprus Business Now, the Cyprus Mail, OCCRP and the Associated Press where stated. It makes no allegation against any person or firm beyond those findings and designations. Opinion is marked as argued reading and concerns the design and public accountability of supervision in Cyprus. This is general information, not legal advice.

Previous: Overseas Territories beneficial ownership registers are no longer fit for purpose

Next: Malta: passports, Pilatus and the price of a licence

Related: The tax-free pitch: what happens when your money goes offshore; When the paper trail is rewritten: what the Deloitte Cyprus reporting means for recovery work; Professional-body AML supervision is no longer fit for purpose; Enabler liability is no longer fit for purpose

Series overview: Offshore: the enabler chain

Sources

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