When FINMA's reach stops at the border

Switzerland's new beneficial ownership register and adviser rules, how information leaves the country, and what UBS 2009, Mozambique 2021 and Greensill 2023 show about where FINMA's powers stop.

Charles Pycraft · November 2026 · London

Cover card: When FINMA's reach stops at the border. Cream and gold serif title on a navy ground. An investigation by Charles Pycraft

On 1 October 2026 Switzerland opened a federal register of beneficial owners. The Federal Act on the Transparency of Legal Persons and the Identification of Beneficial Owners, passed by parliament on 26 September 2025, requires most Swiss companies and certain foreign entities with links to Switzerland to report who ultimately owns or controls them, with separate duties for certain trustees. On the same day a revised Anti-Money Laundering Act brought some lawyers and other advisers into the system for the first time, for certain listed activities such as setting up or running trusts and companies. It does not cover every service they provide.

The register is not open to the public, and filings are being phased in. Its launch comes ahead of the Financial Action Task Force's next evaluation of Switzerland in 2027 to 2028.

An earlier field note set out what the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, FINMA, can do at home. This one follows its powers to the border, through three public cases.

Where the line runs

FINMA supervises institutions that hold a Swiss licence: banks, insurers, securities firms, fund managers, and, since 2020, independent portfolio managers and trustees, whose day to day supervision is carried out by supervisory organisations authorised by FINMA. For financial groups under consolidated Swiss supervision, it can assess risks across the group, subject to the applicable legal and cooperation arrangements. Where a foreign group operates in Switzerland through a branch or subsidiary, it can act against the Swiss unit, not the foreign parent.

A cross-border trust may have foreign governing law, a trustee in Geneva, a protector elsewhere and an underlying company in the British Virgin Islands. Switzerland has no trust law of its own, but since 1 July 2007 has recognised foreign trusts under the Hague Trust Convention.

How information crosses

Information leaves Switzerland through set channels.

Around these channels sits Article 271 of the Swiss Criminal Code. It makes it an offence to carry out, on Swiss territory and without lawful authority, activities for a foreign state that are the responsibility of a public authority or official. Foreign authorities cannot generally exercise official investigative powers in Switzerland without authorisation. They have to ask.

Case one: UBS and the 2009 handover

The clearest test came in February 2009, when the US Department of Justice was investigating UBS over services to American clients. Under a deferred prosecution agreement, UBS agreed to pay US$780 million. The US side also wanted certain client data immediately, and, according to FINMA, the bank faced the threat of criminal charges if it was not handed over.

On 18 February 2009 FINMA ordered UBS to hand over the data of 255 clients, so that it could pass them to the US authorities. FINMA said that charges would have threatened the bank's liquidity and the stability of the Swiss financial system.

On 5 January 2010 the Federal Administrative Court held the order unlawful, finding that FINMA had no power to release client data outside the formal assistance channels. On 15 July 2011 the Federal Supreme Court overturned that ruling and held that, in the situation of the time, FINMA's order was legally correct. The court also found that FINMA's then chairman should have stood aside from the decision.

The formal assistance channels remained the normal procedure. In exceptional circumstances FINMA ordered disclosure outside them once, and it took two courts and more than two years to settle that the order was lawful in the circumstances of February 2009.

Case two: Mozambique, where the fines landed abroad

In 2013 two British subsidiaries of Credit Suisse arranged loans for state-owned companies in Mozambique. On 19 October 2021 FINMA concluded that Credit Suisse had seriously breached organisational requirements and its anti-money laundering reporting duties. It said a suspicious payment of around US$8 million had been made through Credit Suisse to an adviser of Mozambique, and that the bank did not report it to the Swiss money laundering reporting office until 2019. It imposed temporary conditions on new lending to financially weak countries and countries with a high risk of corruption.

The same day, the bank resolved the matter with authorities in London and Washington for about US$475 million. The UK Financial Conduct Authority fined it £147,190,276 and accepted an undertaking to forgive US$200 million of Mozambique's debt. Most of the rest arose from proceedings with the US Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited, a UK subsidiary, pleaded guilty in New York to conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

FINMA said it coordinated closely with the FCA and the SEC, but the tools differed. FINMA could make findings and order measures. It could not fine. The fines landed abroad.

Case three: Greensill, and who gets paid back

In March 2021 Credit Suisse closed four supply chain finance funds linked to the financier Lex Greensill and his companies, in which clients had invested around US$10 billion. On 28 February 2023 FINMA found a serious breach of Swiss supervisory law, ordered remedial measures and opened four proceedings against former managers. FINMA's supervisory measures did not themselves compensate investors. Its tools are aimed at the institution. Questions of compensation fall outside those proceedings and may require separate civil processes, possibly in more than one country.

The advisers

For years, Swiss lawyers and advisers who set up structures, without handling the client's money themselves, were generally outside the Anti-Money Laundering Act. Proposals to bring them in were removed by parliament in the revision it finalised in March 2021. Later that year the Pandora Papers, published by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, reported that the leaked files included information on more than 90 Swiss legal, notary and consulting firms. Appearing in the files is not in itself evidence of wrongdoing.

The 2025 reform changed that. Since 1 October 2026, advisers who carry out certain listed activities on a professional basis, such as setting up or running companies and trusts with no operating business, must identify the client and the beneficial owner, record the purpose of the work and generally join a self-regulatory organisation. Those already active had until 1 December 2026 to apply. Oversight runs through those organisations, which FINMA supervises, rather than through FINMA directly.

Seen, but not yet reached

The border has not moved, but more of what lies beside it is now on record. As filings come in over the transition periods, the new register is intended to show Swiss authorities who stands behind most Swiss companies. Advisers carrying out the listed activities now have to keep records of whom they work for.

What remains is the gap between seeing and acting. FINMA can investigate, order corrective measures and impose certain bans, but it currently has no power to impose fines. Its direct powers over entities outside Switzerland are limited, although it can supervise Swiss operations and cooperate with foreign authorities. A Federal Council consultation on Banking Act changes, which proposes giving FINMA the power to fine, closes on 19 November 2026. The FATF evaluation in 2027 to 2028 will test whether the new rules work in practice.

Next in the series: Moneyland, the country that is not a country.

This field note draws on public legislation, regulatory publications, court decisions and investigative journalism. It is provided for general information and is not legal or tax advice.

Sources