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The rules on private investigators in litigation are no longer fit for purpose: the Black Cube sting, the lost freezing orders and a licensing power never used on investigators

The Court of Appeal called a Black Cube sting on an opposing solicitor "a form of corruption" and lifted every freezing order. Private investigation needs no SIA licence.

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Charles Pycraft · November 2026 · London

Cover image: a hidden microphone sending sound towards a sealed envelope with a cracked gold seal, beside an open padlock with a slack chain. Navy ground, motif in the right third, no text. By Charles Pycraft

Part of Offshore: the enabler chain, pillar 3: Why recovery fails. It follows Insolvency office-holder tracing is no longer fit for purpose in the reading order.

Opinion. Published on 20 November 2026.

The short version

Civil asset recovery runs on freezing orders. They stop a defendant dealing with assets while a fraud claim is tried, and they are discretionary: a claimant who asks for one without notice must tell the court everything that matters, including what counts against it. On 21 July 2026 the Court of Appeal showed that the duty does not simply end once the other side is on notice.

In Salinas Pliego v Astor Asset Management 3 Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 940, the claimants, the businessman Ricardo Salinas Pliego and a company he controls, had employed the private intelligence firm Black Cube (para 2) and, the Court of Appeal said, sanctioned its operation (para 75). A Black Cube operative posed as the representative of a prospective client and drew the defendants' own solicitor, known in the judgment only as X, into three secretly recorded meetings lasting about six and a half hours, most of it in Amsterdam (paras 35 to 40). The court held that this "privilege hunting", which it defined as "obtaining or seeking to obtain an opponent's confidential and privileged information by dishonest means" (para 1), was "a very serious abuse" of its process (para 79). It did not strike out the fraud claim, which goes to trial, but it lifted every worldwide freezing order the claimants had obtained (paras 46, 106 and 110).

The case shows two systems failing at once. A claim the Court of Appeal was prepared to assume is strong on the merits (para 21) has lost its grip on the money. And the industry that ran the operation still needs no SIA licence in England and Wales: the Private Security Industry Act 2001 describes private investigation, but no order has ever designated it for licensing.

In my view, when the law's main answer to a sting on an opponent's lawyer is a remedy after the event, and this one came to light only because the party behind it chose to use the product, the rules on private investigators in litigation are no longer fit for purpose.

The claim, the freeze and the engagement

The underlying dispute concerns a 2021 stock lending agreement. The judgment records that the lender, Astor Asset Management 3, advanced the equivalent of about US$115 million against shares in Grupo Elektra worth about US$415 million. On the court's account the shares appear to have been passed to the defendants and sold, and a surplus of some US$271 million was paid into accounts controlled by an associate of one of the defendants (paras 13 to 16). The claimants say they were induced to sign by false claims of a link to the Astor family (para 17). The defendants deny making any such claim, say the claimants knew and agreed that the shares could be dealt with, and say the claimants defaulted (paras 18 and 19). None of that has been tried.

The claim was issued on 2 August 2024, and the same day the Commercial Court made a worldwide freezing order without notice to the defendants; further orders followed on 7 and 13 August (paras 45 and 46). The defendants applied to discharge them on 20 August 2024 for reasons unconnected with Black Cube, of which they then knew nothing. Mr Justice Calver dismissed that application on 7 October 2024 (para 47).

Between those dates, a letter of engagement with Black Cube was signed, dated 27 August 2024. The named client was a group company that was not a party to the case; the Court of Appeal said "it is a reasonable inference" that it was named "in an attempt to put distance between the claimants and Black Cube" (para 24). The letter promised "elaborate, personalized cover stories" and "Humint Targets" to be approached "to extract relevant information and evidence" (para 25). Black Cube is the name used by BC Strategy UK Ltd; its sole director describes it, the court records, as a litigation support firm "composed of a select group of veterans from special units" and "skilled intelligence officers with a background in law and finance" (para 22).

The claimants redacted the fee terms in the copy before the High Court, saying they were commercially sensitive and irrelevant. The Court of Appeal ordered them produced (para 26): a retainer of £1,144,000, £220,000 if Black Cube made one or more witness statements, £250,000 if its intelligence led to a criminal investigation of any defendant, and a success fee of 4 per cent of the total amount or value received by the named client or any related party if its intelligence was "used" (para 27). Black Cube earned the witness statement fee, and the High Court was not told (para 28). The court said it could "see no justification" for the redaction and that the terms "provided a powerful incentive to Black Cube to adopt unethical methods, as the claimants must have understood" (para 29).

The sting

The judgment sets out the operation in detail (paras 31 to 40). First contact with X came on 3 October 2024, four days before Calver J handed down his judgment keeping the freezing orders in place. A Zoom call followed on 10 October. On 4 November 2024, X met an operative calling himself "Mr Marco Ortelli" in Amsterdam, over lunch and then dinner; at dinner the operative persuaded X to drink alcohol (paras 35 and 37).

The cover story was built to mirror the real case. "Mr Ortelli" described a prospective client wanting to take control of shares pledged as collateral, a structure he called "rehypothecation"; the Court of Appeal said this "was the lever to induce X to talk about the present case" (para 36). The questions recorded in the judgment include "What would be the main flaws and challenges that... you have in your case?" (para 38).

The High Court judge, Stephen Houseman KC, found that X "was deceived and played for a fool by a skilful and well-prepared interrogator armed with insider knowledge", while also holding that X "is responsible for any breach of client confidentiality" (quoted at para 40). The Court of Appeal said the information showed plainly the impact of the litigation, including the freezing orders, on one of the defendants, and that once learned it "could not be unlearned" (para 41).

When the claimants' solicitors at the time, Enyo Law, were told about the recordings, they "refused to look at the video files or listen to the audio files". They were sacked. The new solicitors, LK Law, reviewed the material and exhibited it to an application for summary judgment (paras 3 and 80). LK Law's principal explained that he believed X had waived privilege. The court said that explanation "does not hold water" because "the privilege is not the solicitor's to waive", but accepted it as his genuine belief, and the defendants had expressly made no allegation of misconduct against LK Law's lawyers (paras 80 and 81).

The consequences for X have been, in the court's word, "disastrous": when it gave judgment, he faced disciplinary proceedings before the Solicitors Regulation Authority and "professional ruin" (para 44). The court called it "extraordinary" that the complaint came from the claimants who had procured X's disclosures, rather than from the defendants (footnote 3).

What the courts decided

The High Court held on 13 November 2025 that the operation was an abuse of process and struck out the summary judgment application, but refused to strike out the claim. It deferred two questions to a later hearing: the evidential status of the material, and whether the claimants' knowledge of it put a fair trial at risk ([2025] EWHC 2968 (Comm); para 57). The claimants appealed and the defendants cross-appealed.

Lord Justice Males, with whom Lord Justice Phillips and Lord Justice Foxton agreed, gave the judgment. On abuse: "Some things are so obvious that they do not need much analysis" (para 74). It made no difference that X was at fault, because his disclosure "was the whole object of the Black Cube operation" (para 75). Nor would it matter if some of the material later fell within the iniquity exception to privilege, since the claimants "could not have known that" when they sanctioned the operation (para 77). "To obtain privileged information by suborning the other side's solicitor by deception is a form of corruption" (para 79).

On legality, the court said that "to obtain privileged information from the other side's solicitor by dishonestly pretending to be a prospective client is obviously a civil wrong", and that it "may well have been a criminal offence under section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006". The claimants pointed out that the information was obtained in Amsterdam and said no offence was committed there. The court answered that the first lie was told to X in England, which matters for jurisdiction under sections 1 and 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (para 78). It added that the promise of lucrative new business "may have constituted an offence under section 1 of the Bribery Act 2010, although we did not hear submissions about this" (para 78). It reached "no final decision" on criminality (para 112).

On the response, the court rejected a default rule of striking out the claim (paras 90 to 93). A costs order alone would have been "no more than a mild slap on the wrist" for claimants prepared to pay millions (para 88). The answer was the freezing orders. Had Calver J known of the operation, the court said, "it is equally certain" he would not have continued them: "A party in the course of committing a serious abuse of the process of the court could not have expected to benefit from a discretionary remedy such as a freezing order" (para 103). The claimants argued that their duty of full and frank disclosure, which applies when an order is sought without notice, ended once the defendants were on notice. The court disagreed. The duty normally falls away because a defendant on notice can raise relevant matters itself, but that does not absolve a claimant from telling the court what is highly material and what, as the claimant knows or ought to know, the defendant "cannot possibly know" (para 104). "There was, therefore, a real nexus between the freezing orders and the claimants' abusive conduct" (para 105).

All the freezing orders were lifted, including those supporting proprietary claims. The court accepted "this may create difficulties for the claimants in enforcing any judgment which they may obtain" (para 106). Because the orders should not have continued beyond 7 October 2024, the defendants may apply to enforce the claimants' undertakings in damages (para 108). If the claim succeeds, the trial judge will decide whether the abuse should bar the equitable and discretionary relief sought (para 109).

Four of the defendants then sought to take the strike-out point further. Permission was refused by an order of 24 July 2026, and the Supreme Court refused permission to appeal on 29 October 2026 because the application "does not raise an arguable point of law". The fraud claim continues. The judgment recorded that the deferred High Court hearing, the Information Review Hearing, was listed for November 2026 (para 57). As at 20 November I found no public confirmation that it has taken place and no published outcome.

The claimants' and Black Cube's position

The claimants argued on appeal that the Deputy Judge was wrong to find an abuse without assessing its impact on the proceedings, that the iniquity exception applied and that they should have had summary judgment. In the alternative, they said he should have decided the status of the material first and gave too little weight to the public interest in exposing and remedying the alleged fraud (para 60). Before the High Court, they accepted that the methods were unethical but disavowed responsibility for them, denied obtaining any insight into privileged communications and said they gained no unfair advantage ([2025] EWHC 2968 (Comm), para 7; also reported by Legal Futures). Black Cube told The Telegraph, as Legal Cheek reported on 23 July 2026, that the "evidence was legally obtained and that fact was not contradicted by the court".

The Court of Appeal's answer was blunt: "Whether or not Black Cube's conduct was criminal, it was certainly unlawful as well as abusive" (para 100).

Why this belongs in the recovery chain

The series has followed the lawful routes to information about hidden money. The insolvency tracing piece set out section 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986: compulsory and court-supervised, but only as good as the funding behind it. Civil procedure has its own supervised tools. Under CPR Part 25, a search order requires a Supervising Solicitor who is not an employee or member of the applicant's firm (rules 25.15 to 25.19), and a freezing order application must be supported by evidence on affidavit or affirmation (rule 25.13).

Privilege hunting skips every one of those safeguards. And the price lands on recovery itself. A claimant responsible for it may lose the freeze that was holding the assets, face an application to enforce its undertaking in damages, and risk the equitable relief at trial. Freezing orders already stop at the frontier because the treaties now available leave interim measures out, and the cost of losing them is a cost someone has to pay. On the court's own figures, the operation also delayed the case by about 18 months, adding cost and, in the court's words, prejudice to "other litigants who need to have their disputes resolved by the Commercial Court" (para 73).

Why this reading says "no longer fit for purpose"

A licensing power never used on investigators. Schedule 2, paragraph 4 of the Private Security Industry Act 2001 describes private investigations as surveillance, inquiries or investigations carried out for the purpose of "obtaining information about a particular person or about the activities or whereabouts of a particular person". In England and Wales, licensing bites only on activities the Secretary of State designates by order under section 3(3). As made, the 2006 designation order covers manned guarding, vehicle immobilisation, specified vehicle restriction and removal activities, and keyholding. Private investigation is not on it, and I found no later order that adds it. The Home Office announced on 31 July 2013 that operating as an unlicensed private investigator "will become a criminal offence". In March 2022 the Security Industry Authority said: "No regulation has been proposed or implemented". On 14 October 2026 a Home Office minister told Parliament that the SIA "does not currently regulate Private Investigators" and that the Home Office "will continue to consider whether there is a case for further regulation". The House of Commons Home Affairs Committee recommended regulation in its 2012 report on private investigators (HC 100).

A licence would not have stopped a determined operation. In my view it would give the law a standing lever, conditions and a sanction that does not depend on a victim finding out.

Success fees on intelligence. A 4 per cent share of recoveries ties the investigator's pay to the result of the litigation. The court found that this gave Black Cube "a powerful incentive" to use unethical methods (para 29). I found no rule of court that requires a party relying on investigator evidence to disclose the investigator's fee terms as a matter of course. The court can order it where the terms are relevant. Here the High Court saw a redacted letter, and the terms surfaced only because the Court of Appeal ordered the redactions lifted (paras 26 to 29).

Discovery by accident. The operation came to light because the claimants deployed it. The judgment records that there were other targets. One is known and was not a solicitor; beyond that, "the identity of other targets, and what if any information was obtained from them, is unknown" (footnote 2). The court cited another Black Cube operation, described in a 2021 judgment, that sought, unsuccessfully, to trick a retired judge into making biased comments (para 30, citing Catalyst Capital Group Inc v West Face Capital Inc, 2021 ONSC 7957). Eleven days earlier, in Bourlakova v Anufriev [2026] EWHC 1747 (Ch), the High Court dealt with what the Court of Appeal called "a different form of 'privilege hunting'" (para 111).

Two firms, two answers. Presented with the same recordings, one firm refused to look and was dismissed; the next reviewed and deployed them in what the court accepted was a genuine, if "obviously untenable", belief that privilege had been waived, and the court left that firm's conduct out of its assessment of the abuse (paras 80 and 81). The SRA's guidance on conduct in disputes, published on 4 March 2022, lists as an example of misconduct helping a client give a false explanation of evidence obtained "by illegal means (such as by phone hacking or improper surveillance methods)". In my reading it does not tell a solicitor what to do when a client hands over the product of a covert approach to the other side's lawyer. The Court of Appeal has now said such solicitors "will need to consider carefully, not only their professional responsibilities, but also the possibility that by making use of such material they may be encouraging, or assisting their clients to benefit from, the commission of criminal offences" (para 112).

A duty the rules do not spell out. The duty of full and frank disclosure is judge-made and attaches mainly to applications made without notice. This judgment carries it past that stage for facts the defendant cannot know (para 104). The rewritten Part 25 requires evidence on affidavit or affirmation (rule 25.13) and use of the model order (rule 25.14). It does not mention full and frank disclosure, investigators, or covert approaches to the other side or its lawyers.

Who owns the fix

The Civil Procedure Rule Committee makes the civil rules under section 2 of the Civil Procedure Act 1997, and the Civil Justice Council advises on the civil justice system under section 6. The Home Secretary holds the designation power for England and Wales under section 3(3) of the 2001 Act. The SRA regulates solicitors under the Legal Services Act 2007, whose regulatory objectives in section 1 include "supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law". The Justice Committee and the Home Affairs Committee can ask for timetables.

What should change in the rules on private investigators in litigation

In my view, a court that freezes assets on trust should be told when one side is spying on the other's lawyer, and the people doing it should hold a licence.

  1. Write the continuing duty into the rules. Add to CPR Part 25, Section III and the model freezing order guidance an express, continuing duty to tell the court whether the applicant or anyone acting for it has engaged an investigator to make covert approaches to the respondent, its lawyers or its witnesses, from the without-notice hearing for as long as the order stands or a decision on it is pending. Here the first approach to X came four days before judgment on the discharge application. This builds on paragraphs 103 to 105 of the judgment. Owner: Civil Procedure Rule Committee, under section 2 of the Civil Procedure Act 1997.
  2. Disclose investigator terms when investigator evidence is used. Where a party relies on evidence gathered by a commercial investigator, require disclosure of the payment terms, including any witness statement fee and any success or outcome fee, with redaction only by leave of the court, which can protect terms that are genuinely confidential. The court already controls evidence under CPR 32.1, including the power to exclude evidence that would otherwise be admissible. Owner: Civil Procedure Rule Committee.
  3. Designate private investigation for licensing. Make an order under section 3(3) of the Private Security Industry Act 2001 covering the activities in Schedule 2, paragraph 4, subject to that paragraph's existing exceptions, use licence conditions under section 9 to bar deceptive approaches to a party's lawyers in live proceedings, and publish a timetable, 13 years after the 2013 announcement. Owner: the Home Secretary for the order, with the Security Industry Authority for licensing and enforcement.
  4. Tell solicitors what to do with privilege-hunting product. Update the 2022 conduct in disputes guidance to cover material obtained by covert approaches to an opponent's lawyers: stop reviewing it, secure it, advise the client, and consider whether independent review or directions from the court are needed, with reference to Principle 1 (the rule of law and the proper administration of justice) and paragraphs 1.2 (not taking unfair advantage of others) and 1.4 (not misleading anyone) of the Code of Conduct. Owner: Solicitors Regulation Authority; the Bar Standards Board can do the same for barristers.
  5. Review investigator evidence and privilege in civil cases. Examine admissibility of covertly obtained material, the iniquity exception after Al Sadeq v Dechert LLP [2024] EWCA Civ 28, and the remedies the Court of Appeal used here, including discharge of interim relief and enforcement of undertakings in damages. Owner: Civil Justice Council, with the Ministry of Justice.
  6. Ask for the timetable in public. Take evidence from the Home Office, the SIA and the SRA on private investigators in litigation, 14 years after the Home Affairs Committee's 2012 report. Owner: Justice Committee and Home Affairs Committee.

About this piece

Public sources only, as linked: the Court of Appeal judgment, the Supreme Court's permission decision, legislation.gov.uk, the Civil Procedure Rules, the SRA, the Security Industry Authority, GOV.UK, Parliament and named press reports. It reports a public judgment and names parties, firms and the investigator only as the judgment and published reporting do; the solicitor is referred to as X, as in the judgment. The underlying fraud claim is denied by the defendants and has not been tried. The Court of Appeal held the operation unlawful and a serious abuse for which the claimants were responsible, but made no finding that a criminal offence was committed. Black Cube says the evidence was legally obtained, and before the High Court the claimants disavowed responsibility for its methods. Readings of the rules are marked as my reading; how a court applies them depends on the facts. Opinion is marked as argued reading. This piece is for general information and is not legal advice.

Disclosure: I work on business development and communications for Partisan, a paid file-receipt service built by Oliver Bond. Details: charlespycraft.co.uk/partisan.

Previous: Insolvency office-holder tracing is no longer fit for purpose: section 236, the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 and the empty estate

Next: The circuit: a game of snakes and ladders from Nassau to Zurich, Hong Kong and Dubai

Related: Asset recovery is no longer fit for purpose; Who pays when asset recovery fails: the cost rules are no longer fit for purpose; Cross-border civil enforcement is no longer fit for purpose; The SRA and the Legal Ombudsman are no longer fit for purpose

Series overview: Offshore: the enabler chain

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