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A preface to the enabler chain: how the offshore system fails, who pays, and what would fix it
How offshore enablers move money, why taxpayers and victims pay when recovery fails, and where the Money Laundering Regulations 2017, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 leave gaps.
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100 paragraphs
Charles Pycraft · November 2026 · London
Part of Offshore: the enabler chain, the series preface and reading-order guide.
Opinion. Updated on 19 November 2026.
This series is a map of a system, not a portrait of a country. Offshore structures do not build themselves. Trust lawyers, trustees, nominees, company agents and tax advisers form them, run them and move money through them. Supervisors watch parts of that work. Registers record parts of it. Courts and prosecutors try, afterwards, to recover what went wrong. The question running through the series is simple. Do the people who build and supervise offshore structures, and the authorities that try to recover assets, have the powers and duties they need, and are those powers and duties used effectively?
Holding money offshore is not itself unlawful. Trusts, companies and accounts can serve lawful purposes. These articles are written from public sources: official statistics, statutes, regulator notices, parliamentary reports, court records and established journalism. Where a piece reaches a verdict, it is an argued reading of that public record, not a finding against any person or firm. Nothing here is legal or tax advice.
How the system fails
Read together, the pieces describe one failure repeated in different places. The cost of a harm does not land on the person who caused it. It slides elsewhere.
It starts with the enablers. HM Treasury counts 22 professional body supervisors in the legal and accountancy sectors. The Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision found weaknesses in how some supervisors escalated breaches, including one case where members were given repeated opportunities or too much time to put things right before referral for enforcement (Professional-body AML supervision). In 2024-25, HM Treasury reported that the FCA had 94 full-time financial crime specialists dedicated to anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing supervision. About 16,000 firms were registered with the FCA for that supervision. The Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] contains provisions to support the transfer, which would be made by regulations. The FCA estimates that the changes will affect around 60,000 businesses and sole practitioners now supervised by professional bodies or HMRC, and expects the phased transition to start in late 2028 (FCA financial crime supervision).
Supervision is only half of the enabler gap. The other half is liability. The enabler liability piece reads the Trustee Acts 1925 and 2000, the Limitation Act 1980, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 and the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 together, and argues that they leave too wide a gap between sanctioning misconduct and compensating the people who suffer a loss. A regulator can fine a firm for a breach within its remit. A person who lost money because of that breach has no express right to sue under the Money Laundering Regulations 2017. To seek damages, they would need a separate legal basis and would have to meet any applicable time limit. They may also have to fund the claim.
Then come the registers. The 12-month Companies House identity-check transition for existing directors and people with significant control ended on 17 November 2026, although some individual filing deadlines fall later. The live piece asks how enforcement will be counted (Companies House identity checks). In September 2023, the government told the House of Lords that HMRC had processed about 20 valid Trust Registration Service data requests and that none had succeeded by then. The requests use the disclosure routes in regulation 45ZB of the Money Laundering Regulations 2017. The series found no later official outcome figure (Trust Registration Service). Several Overseas Territories give access to company ownership information to applicants who can show a legitimate interest. Section 51 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 required the UK government to prepare a draft Order in Council for publicly accessible registers of company beneficial ownership in territories that had yet to introduce them (Overseas Territories registers).
Abroad, the gaps take different forms. Switzerland's FINMA still cannot fine institutions (FINMA is no longer fit for purpose). Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Act contains no specific public-interest defence (Article 47). In Cyprus, oversight of trust and company service providers is split between CySEC, the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Cyprus and the Council of the Cyprus Bar Association (Cyprus). In 2019, the FATF and the Asia/Pacific Group found limited use of sanctions across most sectors in Hong Kong and cited a medium-high risk assessment for trust and company service providers (Hong Kong). As far as the series could find, Mauritius's Financial Services Commission publishes no count of how often enhanced checks lead to refusal of a licence (FSC Mauritius). The United States exchanges tax information under FATCA and has not adopted the OECD Common Reporting Standard. The information it sends under reciprocal FATCA agreements covers fewer fields than the OECD standard (The American loophole).
Who pays when recovery fails
When money has gone, recovery is meant to bring it back. The Home Office recorded £345.3 million recovered through confiscation, forfeiture and civil recovery in England, Wales and Northern Ireland in the year ending March 2026. In England and Wales, the HMCTS Trust Statement 2025-26 recorded £3,193 million of gross outstanding confiscation debt at 31 March 2026, including £1,457 million in accrued interest. HMCTS estimated £253 million as recoverable for accounting purposes (Asset recovery).
Victims received £26.1 million in compensation from confiscation receipts that year. On the series' calculation, that was about 17 per cent of the £150.9 million collected under confiscation orders. The taxpayer carries the machinery. The National Audit Office's December 2013 report, the most recent itemised costing of the whole confiscation system I found, estimated an annual cost of £102 million in England and Wales. That included £20.8 million for legal aid and £18.5 million for keeping people in prison for non-payment (Who pays when asset recovery fails).
The other routes leave gaps of their own. The latest statutory report listed by the Home Office covers 15 May 2024 to 14 May 2025. It records five applications for Unexplained Wealth Orders in England and Wales, all granted (Unexplained Wealth Orders). In June 2021 the European Commission told the depositary that the EU was not in a position to consent to UK accession to the Lugano Convention (Cross-border civil enforcement). After PACCAR, ministers pledged in December 2025 to legislate on litigation funding. By 18 November 2026, the series had found no replacement Bill or timetable for that pledge (Litigation funding after PACCAR). The Insolvency Service reported a £14.9 million deficit on services subject to insolvency fees in 2025-26, met by funding from the Department for Business and Trade. An empty estate may be unable to pay for tracing (Insolvency office-holder tracing). The Legal Ombudsman's compensation cap is £50,000 per complaint; fee refunds, interest and complaint costs sit outside that cap (The SRA and the Legal Ombudsman). In my reading, the result is that the public purse pays for the attempt, and the victim pays for the failure.
How the pieces build
The series runs in four pillars, and each is meant to be read in order.
Pillar 1. How money moves, and who enables it. The opening pieces map the machinery: London as the hub, the quiet desk where trust lawyers sit between client and shell, the tax-free pitch, the leaks, Swiss secrecy, the newer centres in Dubai, Singapore and Hong Kong, the Crown Dependencies, the Overseas Territories, the Bahamas, Cyprus and Malta.
Pillar 2. Why the watchdogs miss it. These pieces test named supervisors and rules: FINMA in three steps, Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Act, UK professional-body and FCA supervision, enabler liability, Companies House, the Trust Registration Service, the American loophole, the Swiss self-regulatory layer, the FSC Mauritius, the SRA and the Legal Ombudsman, and HMRC on serious offshore evasion.
Pillar 3. Why recovery fails. Confiscation, who pays, Unexplained Wealth Orders, cross-border civil enforcement, litigation funding and insolvency tracing.
Pillar 4. What needs to change. The verdict pieces set out proposed fixes and identify the public bodies that can act on them. The aim is a permanent fix for each loophole, not a one-off enforcement push. A standalone reform-agenda page is still to come. Until then, the hub's summary of what needs to change and its Known gaps table gather the proposals in one place, and the closing piece, The circuit, plays the whole chain as a game of snakes and ladders: a fictional client slides down the rat runs, and each ladder is the fix the matching piece proposes.
What the combined fixes would achieve
Taken one at a time, each fix looks technical: a published count of refusals, a fining power, a register request that actually succeeds, wider powers for courts to direct confiscation receipts to victims, an indemnity requirement for trustees and company providers, a date for a Bill. Taken together, they change who carries the risk. Regulators would use existing powers to sanction officers personally where they were knowingly concerned in a specified breach. People whose losses were caused or materially contributed to by a breach of a specified duty would have a new statutory claim against the regulated firm. Supervisors would publish what they refuse as well as what they approve. Registers would open to the people who need them. The recovery proposals would give victims greater priority and reduce delays in enforcing judgments across borders. Some changes can be made using powers already in force. Others need legislation, commencement or funding.
A system serves everyone when the consequence of an act lands on the person who caused it, and when integrity in ordinary work is the normal path rather than the expensive one.
How to use the series
Readers in Parliament, in regulators, in law and in finance can treat the series as a briefing pack: the map, the official figures, the owner of each proposed fix, and the questions a committee or a compliance team can already ask. The entrance is the hub at charlespycraft.co.uk/offshore. On the hub, the Legislation tracker lists Swiss and UK laws, Bills, consultations, ministerial statements and parliamentary dates. Each entry gives its status, an official source, the date it was checked and the next date where one is set. A Known gaps table sets each gap against its status and proposed fix.
I have covered OffshoreAlert's London conference on a press pass since 2017. The next is OffshoreAlert London 2026, on 30 November and 1 December.
Reading order
Pillar 1. How money moves, and who enables it
- The Spider's Web: London as the hub
- Moneyland: not a country
- The quiet desk: how trust lawyers sit between client and shell
- The tax-free pitch: what happens when your money goes offshore
- Panama Papers without the myth
- Switzerland: how banking secrecy was built
- Suisse Secrets: when the ledger left the vault
- Dubai, Singapore and the new quiet rooms
- Singapore's S$3 billion money laundering case: where gatekeeper checks fell short, and what the 2024 and 2025 Acts left open
- Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man: London's inner web
- Overseas Territories beneficial ownership registers are no longer fit for purpose
- The Bahamas: secrecy after the leaks, and why the Register of Beneficial Ownership Act 2018 is no longer fit for purpose
- Cyprus after Cyprus Confidential: Russian wealth, sanctions, and why gatekeeper supervision under Law 188(I)/2007 is no longer fit for purpose
- Malta: passports, Pilatus and the price of a licence
- Hong Kong's trust and company service providers: why Cap. 615 licensing is no longer fit for purpose
- China Turns the Light on Offshore Trusts
- The Finance Curse comes to the Frontline Club
Pillar 2. Why the watchdogs miss it
- FINMA: what Switzerland's regulator can and cannot do
- When FINMA's reach stops at the border
- FINMA is no longer fit for purpose
- Swiss banking secrecy is no longer fit for purpose: Article 47 of the 1934 Banking Act
- Professional-body AML supervision is no longer fit for purpose
- FCA financial crime supervision is no longer fit for purpose: the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 and the 2028 transfer
- Enabler liability is no longer fit for purpose: what trust lawyers, trustees and company providers face
- Companies House identity checks: enforcement is no longer fit for purpose
- The Trust Registration Service is no longer fit for purpose: regulations 45 to 45ZB of the Money Laundering Regulations 2017
- The American loophole: why the rules around Delaware, Nevada, Wyoming and South Dakota trusts are no longer fit for purpose
- The Swiss SRO layer, STEP, and the cost of fighting back
- The FSC Mauritius is no longer fit for purpose
- The SRA and the Legal Ombudsman are no longer fit for purpose
- HMRC is no longer fit for purpose on serious offshore evasion
Pillar 3. Why recovery fails
- Asset recovery is no longer fit for purpose
- Who pays when asset recovery fails: the cost rules are no longer fit for purpose
- Unexplained Wealth Orders are no longer fit for purpose: the Criminal Finances Act 2017 and the 2022 reforms
- Cross-border civil enforcement is no longer fit for purpose: the Lugano Convention 2007, Hague 2005 and Hague 2019 after Brexit
- Litigation funding after PACCAR is no longer fit for purpose: section 58AA, the 2013 Regulations and a promised Bill with no date
- Insolvency office-holder tracing is no longer fit for purpose: section 236, the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 and the empty estate
Pillar 4. What needs to change
On the hub, see What needs to change, Known gaps and the Legislation tracker.
Beside the series
Case studies and charts, not numbered chapters of the argument:
- The Offshore Top 10: edition 1
- False invoices and fake gold: what the £266 million Bradford case shows about paper trails
- What the Deloitte Cyprus reporting means for recovery work (reporting by the BBC, the Guardian and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Deloitte Cyprus has said it acts in compliance with all applicable laws.)
- The Maharaja of Faridkot: how the courts tested a forged will
OffshoreAlert diary:
- OffshoreAlert London 2026: back at St Paul's, 30 November to 1 December
- Off to Bangkok: looking forward to OffshoreAlert Bangkok 2027
- Nine years of help: thank you, David Marchant
Records notes:
What firms can do now. In assurance, insolvency and investigation work, a question that keeps coming back is whether a file has changed. Partisan records a file's fingerprint without seeing or keeping the document, gives a dated receipt, and shows a file is unchanged since it was recorded. Try it on one PDF for £45 (credited towards a full job), or cover a whole firm's assurance, insolvency or investigation files for £350 a month. partisangateway.com
About this piece
This preface draws only on the live series pieces it links and the official sources those pieces cite. It makes no allegation against any person or firm and names no party to any private dispute. Opinion is marked as argued reading. Disclosure: I work on business development and communications for Partisan, which offers file fingerprint receipts for comparing copies, and the note on what firms can do now describes its paid service. Partisan supplied nothing else for this article.
Series overview: Offshore: the enabler chain
Sources
The figures below come from the official sources cited in the linked series pieces. The victims' share of confiscation receipts is calculated from the Home Office figures.
- HM Treasury, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing supervision report 2024-25 (8 December 2025); OPBAS findings on professional body supervisors: via Professional-body AML supervision and FCA financial crime supervision
- Home Office, Asset recovery statistics, year ending March 2026 (10 September 2026, updated 15 September 2026); HMCTS Trust Statement 2025-26: via Asset recovery and Who pays
- National Audit Office, Confiscation orders (December 2013) and progress review (March 2016): via Who pays
- Latest statutory report on Unexplained Wealth Orders: via Unexplained Wealth Orders
- Insolvency Service Annual Report and Accounts 2025-26: via Insolvency office-holder tracing
- Legal Ombudsman scheme rules (compensation cap): via The SRA and the Legal Ombudsman
- Statutes: Money Laundering Regulations 2017, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018
- Lugano Convention 2007 and the EU decision of 2021; PACCAR and the December 2025 commitment: via Cross-border civil enforcement and Litigation funding after PACCAR
Updated on: 19 November 2026.